Patrick Wu

scorpio7500@inbox.com

Rutgers University

The Problem of Moral Failure

The study of ethical theory is often one of the more interesting and relatable, albeit frustrating, topics of investigation within the field of philosophy. Questions about fairness, justice, equality, and the distinction between what is right and what is good give rise to as many different moral theories as there are able minds to approach the issues. Yet one problem stands out to me as particularly worrisome from the bevy of moral quandaries; this is the problem of *moral failure*.

The problem can be explained in the following way. In general, most people follow some moral theory that they believe in as a prescriptive guideline for their actions, whether it be their day-to-day interactions with others or their future long-term projects. However, people will often fail to follow what they think is the moral course of action for unjustifiable reasons. Take the case of the impassioned environmentalist, who believes that conservation of reusable resources is the course of action that would produce the most good in the world, all things considered, and that everyone should do the most that they can to contribute their part in the effort. However, one night, she refuses to take out the recycling because it’s the middle of winter and she’s already wrapped up in a warm blanket before a roaring fireplace. Think also of the charitable magnate, who is convinced that helping the poor in his city would be the best thing to do for all its inhabitants, all things considered, yet in light of that still decides to buy himself a private yacht in order to impress his socialite friends, instead of using that same money to invest in ways to deliver resources to impoverished inner-city residents. And what about the well-meaning parent, who is a professed pacifist, yet at times beats her son when his constantly insubordinate attitude sends her into a blind rage?.

What is striking about these examples is that it makes no difference whether or not one of the particular theories described is more or less correct than the other from an objective standpoint. The problem is that *even on their own terms*, all of the people above failed to follow through on what they believed to be the moral course of action. That is to say, it does not matter which moral theory they subscribe to, or whether such a theory gives the best possible choice to follow *sub specie aeternitatis*, for surely they can at least justify *to themselves* that in following a theory of their own choosing that they are following a theory by which they expect to do the most good, and consequently expect themselves to follow. This means that given each circumstance above, each agent has no rationalbasis to justify his or her actions. The environmentalist knows that she *ought* to go outside and take the recycling out, but she’s warm and comfortable and doesn’t want to leave her spot in front of the fire. Likewise, the magnate knows that his money would be much better spent on helping the needy, but he is vain and anxious to appear grandiloquent in front of his peers, and the mother is committed to the belief that violence is wrong, but can be roused to such anger at her son’s behavior that she ignores her own better judgment. In each case, there is no question about whether they were led by false belief to commit these acts; every person chose to act upon the non-moral decision *in spite of* the knowledge that what they were doing was far worse than an alternative possible action. This seems deeply problematic for moral philosophy, because such scenarios can plausibly be repeated indefinitely for all rational agents, for what is to stop the environmentalist from staying in the next night, or the magnate from buying something even more lavish next time, or even the mother from flying into another uncontrollable rage? If that is the prospect in store for us, then what is the point of debating ethical theory when the ones laid out cannot even be reasonably followed? One may just as well turn to moral nihilism in that case.

In this paper I will investigate possible responses to this dilemma, starting with an outline of the classic Rationalist versus Anti-Rationalist argument about the nature of reasons, drawing from both Kant and Hume. I will then discuss Bernard Williams’ work regarding the collision between objective and subjective motivation, or more generally, internal and external reasons for motivation. I will end by explaining that even if we fail to reconcile our moral failures with explanations concerning our motivations, and even if as a result we find moral nihilism to be *exceedingly* plausible, we can still reject it on the grounds of practical reason through Jacob Ross’s work, *Rejecting Ethical Deflationism*.

**I**

The debate between Rationalism and Anti-Rationalism is one which stretches back to the Early Modern period of philosophy leading up to Immanuel Kant. In general terms, Rationalists believe that knowledge can be acquired *a priori*, or independently of features about the world. On the other hand, Anti-Rationalists believe that all knowledge is derived *a posteriori*,from facts about the world.[[1]](#footnote-1) These points of views need not always conflict; only when they attempt to describe the same theoretical domain do they collide, as they do here.

The main point of contention between these two theories within the moral domain is the origin of moral motivation. Kant, the Great Rationalist, believed that a possession of the faculty of reason can enable all rational agents to reach the same conclusions. Insofar as he believes that there are universal features of morality that come from within rational agents, he is an *objectivist internalist*. In contrast, Hume, the Great Anti-Rationalist, took an antipodal position to Kant, and declared that reason shall ever be a slave to the passions, which on Hume’s account would be his dispositional motivations. What’s more, he said, it would be *unreasonable* for morality to expect of him actions which run *contrary* to his dispositional motivations. To clarify these terms, dispositional motivations are those which come from one’s own character, where character here is defined as one’s particular beliefs, hopes, desires, wants, and other similar mental states. These motivations in turn arise from one’s nature as a human being, and can include things such as your genetic makeup and your particular existence as it is bounded both spatially and temporally. By this definition no two subjects will have the same dispositional motivations, because everyone has different motivations for themselves and what they wish to do in their lives. Therefore, Hume is a *subjectivist internalist*. This stands in contrast to rational motivations, which prescribe reason as an objective, independent means for providing all rational agents with the same basis upon which to formulate their moral theories.[[2]](#footnote-2)

If I am correcting in interpreting Hume, then what he seems to be implying is this, that if we were all *purely rational agents*, that is to say, agents who were not constrained by the types of beings that they were in the world, then Kant would be right in claiming reason to be the source of moral motivation. However, given our nature as human beings, we are not so; our nature as beings is constrained by our bodies, and so reason must be subordinate to those motivations which come from them. This seems to be hold true, especially when it comes to problems of weakness of the will, where someone will not do that which seems most rational because he is unwilling to exert the effort to do so. After all, we, like all other things, are governed by the Laws of Conservation of Energy.

The problem that arises with Hume’s theory of dispositional motivation is that his moral theory tends so far to the subjective that it becomes impossible to evaluate actions based on a commonly agreed-upon standard of right or wrong. If everyone’s decisions stem from only their dispositional motivations, then there are no objective judgments that can be passed on anyone. On the Humean account, Charles Manson would be justified in the murder of Sharon Tate and her unborn child, as long as it was motivated by one of his dispositions. This seems to be grossly unreasonable; there’s something deeply wrong in suggesting that anyone is justified to do anything so long as they were *predisposed* to do such a thing. Hume qualifies this by saying that it is a universal disposition to sympathize with other rational beings.[[3]](#footnote-3) Although I find this a weak response, not merely because it does not even solve the problem I just laid out, my concern in this paper is not with Hume’s ideas *per se*, but with the influential groundwork that he and Kant laid for developing the arguments of future generations of philosophers, and so I will pursue no further his theories. The important distinction to take away from Kant and Hume’s views is that Kant believes that reason, being independent of agency, can be used to prescribe the moral law, whereas Hume joins a tradition of *moral sense theorists* when he claims that it is due to the kind of beings we are, with the necessary social interactions that we make with others on top of our dispositions, that give rise to our moral underpinnings.[[4]](#footnote-4)

Does this answer the problem of moral failure? So far, what we have seems promising, but insufficient. The Humean theory of moral motivation can explain why agents are motivated by disposition rather than reason, but it doesn’t explain why they *know* that there are other courses of action which seem to them *better* than what they’re doing now, since on the Humean model all dispositional motivations are sufficiently justifiable on their own account.

**II**

Hume’s actual discourses treat the matter with more complexity than what I have given here, but for Neo-Humeans such as Bernard Williams, enough has been said to be sufficient for their purposes. In *Internal and External Reasons*, Williams identifies two main categories of reason for action, such that they satisfy the statement, ‘A has a reason to *Φ*’, where ‘*Φ*’ can be any action.[[5]](#footnote-5) These are, as the title naturally suggests, ‘internal’ and ‘external’ reasons.

Williams describes ‘internal’ reasons as reasons which can be stated in the following manner:

**I:** *A* has a reason to *Φ* iff *A* has some desire the satisfaction of which will be satisfied by his *Φ*-ing. (101)

This model he ascribes to Hume as the *sub-Humean model* (101), sub-Humean because Williams recognizes that Hume’s own claims are not so simple, as stated before. Williams then adds four corollaries to **I**, as propositions which underlie his theory of internal reasons.

These corollaries are linked to the nature of dispositional motivations described in the previous section. Here Williams takes all the possible dispositions that can give rise to internal reasons within an agent and consolidates them into what he terms the agent’s *subjective motivational set* (102). Hereafter I will use Williams’ own terminology and refer to this as an agent’s **S**.The types of elements that can exist in **S** are numerous, and they can contain, in addition to all the dispositions already suggested by Hume, “such things as dispositions of evaluation, patterns of emotional reaction, personal loyalties, and various projects, as they may be abstractly called, embodying commitments of the agent” (105). All of these elements can be used, either separately or in any combination, to formulate reasons for action. Based on this definition of **S**, Williams establishes the following corollary to the Internal Reasons Theory:

**I(1):** An internal reason statement is falsified by the absence of some appropriate element from **S**. (102)

**I(1)** is constructed in such a way that it avoids problems that would come about if Williams were to claim that any element in **S** would give rise to an internal reason, such as the problem of elements coming into **S** which are based off of false belief. This will be explained with his second corollary.

Williams’ goal for the Internal Reason Theory is to ground an agent’s internal reasons in rationality, so that this theory is not simply an explanation of which reasons are good and which are bad. This is not to say that having explanations for reasons is trivial, for Williams does note that “if there are actions for reason, it must be that people sometimes act for those reasons, and if they do, their reasons must figure in some correct explanation of their actions” (102). Williams, however, wants the Internal Reasons Theory to do more work than simply give an descriptive account of incorrect reasons, and thus gives the second corollary to the Internal Reasons Theory:

**I(2):** A member of **S**, **D**, will not give *A* a reason for *Φ*-ing if either the existence of **D** is dependent on some false belief, or *A*’s belief in the relevance of *Φ*-ing to the satisfaction of **D** is false. (103)

An example Williams gives to illustrate is the agent who believes that some liquid is gin when it is really petrol. This agent wants to drink gin tonight. If we apply our proposition to this agent, whom we shall call Tom, then Tom has a reason to drink some liquid because he has a desire to drink gin, and we can add further that he believes that this liquid is gin. Naturally our inclination is to say, given our knowledge that the liquid is petrol, that Tom doesn’t have a reason to drink the petrol, even though he himself believes that he does. However, if he does drink the petrol, we would have an explanation for his actions: that it was based on a false belief (102). This is necessary because Williams is very concerned with establishing the Internal Reasons Modelas a theory that can address *A*’s rational processes, rather than a theory that merely explains actions that are misguided, for reasons that will become clear later on. Put another way, **I(2)** can be restated thus:

**I(2.1):** If a reason *R* to act ιs based on any element **D** from agent *A*’s **S** which is grounded in false belief, then *R* is not a reason on the Internal Reasons Theory.

We can see now why **I(1)** was phrased in the way that it was; it avoids the possibility of reasons being created by false beliefs. Instead of attributing to [*R*] merely incorrectness, where [*R*] is the set of all possible reasons based on false beliefs, Williams denies them the possibility of being reasons at all. Henceforth I shall refer to these mental states as *internally denied reasons*.

The next logical step to take is to ask how it is that Tom can still believe that he has a reason *R* to *Φ*, if *R* has been invalidated as a reason by **I(2)**? Moreover, it seems not only plausible that Tom *does* still believe that he has a reason to drink that petrol, but that it would not be *irrational* for him to do so. Williams knows this as well, noting that, “it will, all the same, be true that if he does *Φ* in these circumstances, there was not only a reason why he *Φ*-ed, but also that that displays him as, relative to his false belief, acting rationally. To account for this, Williams presents his third corollary:

**I(3): (a)** *A* may falsely believe an internal reason statement about himself.

**(b)** *A* may not know some true internal reason statement about himself.

**I(3)** covers instances where *A* is ignorant of some fact about which he could formulate an element **D** to act on *Φ*. **I(3)** also accounts for the fact that *A* can act *instrumentally rationally* on an element in **S**, **D**, which is dependent on false belief, even though this will not give him an *internal reason*. In the case of Tom, this can explain why he still believes that he has a reason to drink the petrol; he is unaware of the fact that the liquid is in fact not gin, but petrol. Cases of **I(3.b)** involve cases where an agent may be unaware of some element in his **S** that could give rise to some true internal reason statement about himself, possibly because it lies in his subconscious realm (103).

From these cases Williams comes to his final corollary, which the following:

**I(4):** Internal reason statements can be discovered in deliberative reasoning. (104)

**I(4)** rests on three observations. One of them is the possibility of false belief entailing element **D**, which leads to **I(2)**. The second is **I(3)**, that an agent can either falsely believe an internal reason statement about himself, or else be unaware of a true statement that pertains to him. The final observation is the fact that an agent’s subjective motivational set is not a static array, but is an ever-changing flux of elements which weave in and out as the agent interacts with the world, himself included. This allows Williams make an important inference: that with deliberation, one can add new elements to **S**, which in turn can give rise to new *internal reasons* (105). Williams does not directly define what he means by the process of deliberative reasoning, but it can be assumed that what he’s talking about is any process of rational scrutiny involving **S**. This could be anything from adding new elements to **S** to permuting existing ones in a way which gives rise to a new reason for action, that would subsequently maximize the satisfication of these elements.

The process of adding new internal reasons is an essential part of Williams’ theory, because without it there would be a possibility of exhausting all possible permutations of elements within a finite sample space. This in turn would mean an end to all possible causes for reasons for action, unless Williams were to suggest that we are each born with either an infinite, inexhaustible amount of elements, or so many that the resulting set of possible combinations would exceed the number that we could probably make within our lifetimes. That, however, seems to be begging the question, so I will simply take it that the final corollary is a solution to the problem of *exhaustive reasoning*.

The final point that Williams makes about internal reasons concerns the notion of *needs*, and how they factor into a theory of subjective motivational sets. Williams avoids the question of what constitutes a need, and instead presumes that “insofar as there are determinately recognizable needs, there can be an agent who lacks any interest in getting what he indeed needs” (105). Williams goes on to claim that

if an agent really in uninterested in pursuing what he needs, and this is not the product of false belief, and he could not reach any such motive from motives he has by the kind of deliberative processes we have discussed, then I think we do have to say that in the internal sense he indeed has no reason to pursue these things. (105)

Williams goes on to further claim that if we truly believe that there is a need that *A* lacks which entails his having a reason to act upon it, even if he himself has no interest in pursuing it, that would be an *external reason statement* (106).

Williams gives the example of Owen Wingraves to illustrate an external reason. Owen’s family all want him to join the army because he comes from a ancestry of fine soldiers and it has become a matter of family honor. Owen himself has no motivation to join the army, but his family insists that there is a *reason* for him to join this. This reason must necessarily be external (106).

In analyzing this example, Williams makes an important claim when trying to understand the domain of possible explanation for external reasons; he comes to the conclusion that “no external reason could by itself offer an explanation of anyone’s action” (106). He explains this by pointing out that agents’ actions can be explained by finding some motivation **M** within their **S** that would lead them to form an *internal* reason for acting on **M**. Here he also posits that there is a *constitutive* relation between reasons for action and motivations. I agree with this claim; I cannot think of a way in which one can be motivated to *Φ* without a corresponding reason to do the same.[[6]](#footnote-6) However, *external* reasons cannot be explained this way because they are *eo ipso* independent of agential motivations. That is what makes them impartial and objective. Williams believes that the connection between the truth of the external reason statement itself and the action that an agent takes because of that external reason is *belief* (107). One cannot act upon an external reason without first believing it to be true.

The problem, as Williams puts it, is how agents can make the connection “between acquiring a motivation and coming to believe the reason statement” in a way unique to external reasons, and which doesn’t involve the process of deliberative reasoning from **I(4)** (108). Williams, following in the tradition of Humes, says that there isn’t, on the basis that external reasons *have no basis* by which to enter an agent’s **S**, because all motivations in **S** have to be arrived at through some previous motivation in order to add it to **S**, and that can only be done through the process of deliberation. Williams declares that on those grounds “it is very plausible to suppose that all external reason statements are false. For, *ex hypothesi*, there is no motivation for the agent to deliberate *from*, to reach this new motivation” (109). If we look again at the case of Owen, if he does join the army, the reason must lie within his **S**; he could not have been motivated to do so himself.

There is undoubtedly force to Williams’ claims, and their position can be further supported. A common course of action we take when trying to make someone do *Φ* on the basis of some external reason **E** is the action of *convincing*. When we say that we are trying to convince *A* of the truth of **E** what we really mean is that we are trying to explain to *A* the truth of **E** in such a way that he *believes* us and accepts **E**. If we take the deliberation process to include a comparison between rationally-related old and new elements, and from there to make an executive decision on whether to adopt or cast away any elements we might change our reasons about, then we have a convincing argument for rejecting external reasons, since they have no unique means of convincing the agent of their truth without making him deliberate with his **S**, which necessarily entails internal reasons from **I(4)**. There is one counter-argument I can see to this view, and it is that one can argue that the example of Owen Wingraves is not *truly* an external reason statement insofar as this reason came from Owen’s family members, who are themselves agents. It can be argued that an external reason should be independent from *all* agential motivations, and true external reasons must absolutely impartial. One possible example of a purely independent external reason may be utilitarianism, which is concerned only with the expected utility of outcomes, or states of affairs. Even so, utilitarianism requires agents to subscribe to its theory in order to make any effect on the world, and to do that means that they must use **I(4)**, which again revolves back to agents acting on internal reasons.

**III**

Williams’ theory of Internal and External Reasons does not specifically concern moral reasons, but it can still be applied to motivations and reasons within the moral domain. In another work, *Persons, Character and Morality,* Williams describes the difficulty that frequently arises in making decisions concerning the purpose of one’s life, when he writes:

The deeply disparate character of moral and non-moral motivation, together with the special dignity or supremacy attached to the moral, makes it very difficult to assign to those other relations and motivations the significance or structural importance in life some of them are capable of possessing.[[7]](#footnote-7)

In this paper Williams is very worried about the demands that moral theories make of him, and what they expect him to sacrifice for the sake of moral duty. Williams contends that there are certain desires, projects, and goals, upon the pursuance of which depends his purpose for existence, and that, in an echo of Hume, it cannot be reasonable for morality to demand of him actions which conflict with such desires that would make his existence worthwhile, as he states here:

There can come a point at which it is quite unreasonable for a man to give up, in the name of the impartial good ordering of the world of moral agents, something which is a condition of having any interest in being around in that world after all. (14)

To put it into terms we have discussed already, within everyone’s **S**, on this account there are at least some elements [**X**] without which one’s life would not be worth living, and Williams believes that for morality to expect him to give those up for a system which pays no special regard to his existence is absurd. These moral theories can be considered external reasons, and here especially they provide agents without sufficiently good reason to accept their theories.

Drawing from both this and *Internal and External Reasons*, what do we do, now that we’ve rejected all external reasons statements, including moral ones? In accepting Williams’ arguments, there is no longer any way to determine across the board whether agent *A*’s moral reasons for action are better or worse off than *B*’s. Comparisons can no longer be made between agents, so how can we know if a wrong has been committed?

One way to look at it is to evaluate each agent *on his own terms*. Instead of establishing a moral standard for everyone to follow, we could allow each agent to set his own goals for himself based on his own **S**, and live up to his own standards. In allowing each agent the freedom to choose his own moral code, there is a sense in which we grant them *greater* responsibility than when the moral thing to do was universal across agents.

So how does this relate to our initial question of moral failure? By all accounts the three agents mentioned in the beginning of this paper, the enviromentalist, the magnate, and the mother were operating on internal reasons. Each had a specific set of dispositions **D** within their respective **S**’s that led them to develop their moral reasons for action. Can we account for their failure to act on their reasons using the model of internal reason that Williams has set forth?

What’s clear is that in each of these cases, there is an overriding element in each agent’s **S**, which took priority over their moral interests. Given that Williams’ theory is a rejection of moral systems which seek to be objective and independent of agency, it is impossible to judge each individual across the same standard of moral judgments. However, as discussed above we can still evaluate them on their own terms, given that they all had their own moral reasons that they believed.

Unfortunately, it soon becomes apparent that even when we apply Williams’ principles of internal reasons to these people, we are still left with an unsatisfactory answer. None of these three was acting out of false belief that their reason for not doing their respective moral dutiy was the one which would produce the most good. And even with deliberation, each of the three don’t satisfy themselves *on their own terms*. They failed to meet their own standards because each of their dispositional attitudes had some dispositional tendency which prevented them from acting on their internal moral reason. The environment was lazy, the magnate was proud, and the mother was wrathful. The problem is that if tbey deliberate, and decide that their moral reasons expect too much and adjust them to account for their dispositional vices, they can iterate this function until they are left with nothing but their dispositional vices.

**IV**

If an neither an internalist nor an externalist account of moral reason can justify moral failure, does that mean we fall into moral nihilism? According to Jacob Ross, it doesn’t matter. In his essay, *Rejecting Ethical Deflationism*, Ross argues that there is a way to rationally reject morally relativistic theories such as moral nihilism.

Ross begins by highlighting several actions one takes when considering theories in the course of practical reasoning. He defines acceptance as “an attitude taken toward a theory or proposition in the course of practical reasoning or in the guidance of an action.”[[8]](#footnote-8) He also notes that one can hold greater or lesser degrees of acceptance and credence in different theories. When we make practical decisions, frequently we will have many options to choose from, each with varying degrees of acceptability. Usually, Ross correctly points out, when faced with such a decision, we will employ some sort of heuristic to eliminate some of the choices which we find less plausible. This Ross terms the *heuristic of theory rejection* (746).

Ross’s next course of action centers around the rejection of *absolutely deflationary theories*. These are theories which state that all moral theories are equally as good or as bad any other, and include theories such as moral nihilism, absolute relativism, and non-discrminatory theories. Ross states that all of these theories can be defeated, if you’re facing a scenario where you have to choose one type of theory over another. This is due to the *dominance principle*: given any number of absoutely-deflationary theories, and at least one non-deflationary theory, if we have a true theory that’s not absolutely relativistic, we can always elect to choose that one. This can be justified on grounds of rationality, as Ross explains. First he asks us to consider a case where our credence is divided up among a number of different theories. Some of these theories are absolutely relativistic; they dictate that any two ethical theories would neither be worse nor better than the other. If, Ross, says, “anyone one of these absolutely relativistic theories is true, then no acceptance distribution is better than any other” (752). On ther other hand, if there was at least one true theory that was not absolutely relativistic, then Ross claims that, “conditional on the assumption that the true theory is not absolutely relativistic, rejecting all the absolutely relativistic theories would be an optimal strategy” (752). We can further illustrate this with Expected Utility Theory: in such a case, each absolutely relativistic theory would have an expected utility of zero, since it would accept all theories as valid. On the other hand, if the true theory is not absolutely relativistic, its expected utility would be some number greater than zero. Therefore, no matter how great the number of absolutely relativistic theories we have, we can always reject them unanimously in favor of the true theory.

In our case, and herein lies the strength of Ross’s argument, even if moral nihilism seemed exceedingly plausible, and we gave it a credence of .9999 over a .0001 level of credence in Williams’ Internal Reason Theory, the expected value of moral nihilism would be 0, and Williams’ theory would be at least be a nonzero number. This means that when we take an acceptance distribution, ,9999 times 0 is still 0, and I may get an exceedingly small value for the Internal Reason Theory, but it still holds dominance over moral nihilism, and thus accepting that would be the optimal strategy.

**V**

It is often said that the study of moral philosophy leaves us with too many answers. Among the midst of moral systems competing for our attention, Williams and Ross remind us all that sometimes it is best not to worry about the moral fate of the entire world, or even of other people, and that perhaps what is most important is that we hold ourselves accountable *to ourselves*. Even when we fall victim to our own vices, it is never too much that we should sink into despair. If nothing else, at reason tells us it’s always better to make the choice, no matter how slim the possibility, that will make the world a better place.

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1. Markie, Peter, Markie,. "Rationalism vs. Empiricism." *Stanford University*. Stanford University, 19 Aug. 2004. Web. 14 Dec. 2013. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Hume also believes that human beings can have desires without reasons, namely, *desires without reaons*. I find this to be incomprehensible, and so will not pursue this any further. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Note that this is still compatible with subjectivism, because it can only be applied to all members of the human species, not to all rational agents. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Cohon, Rachel, Cohon,. "Hume's Moral Philosophy." *Stanford University*. Stanford University, 29 Oct. 2004. Web. 13 Dec. 2013. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Williams, Bernard. "Internal and External Reasons." *Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers, 1973-1980*. Cambridge [Cambridgeshire: Cambridge UP, 1981. 101. Print. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. This may just be my inability to comprehend motivations being done for no reason at all, but I do not think it too implausible to follow the line of argument above. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Williams, Bernard. "Persons, Character and Morality." *Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers, 1973-1980*. Cambridge [Cambridgeshire: Cambridge UP, 1981. 2. Print. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Ross, Jacob. "Rejecting Ethical Deflationism." *Ethics* 116.4 (2006): 743. Print. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)